By MELINDA J. OVERSTREET
for Glasgow News 1
The former Glasgow Police Department chief who later became an officer and was fired last year took little time in getting a notice filed with the Kentucky Court of Appeals that he is not happy about the fact his lawsuit against the city and the GPD was dismissed recently by Barren Circuit Judge John T. Alexander.
This was the third time Guy Turcotte has sued the city over employment-related decisions and is the third time he has sought to have the circuit court ruling on those cases overturned by a higher court. None of his previous attempts have been successful.
Turcotte was accused in January 2023 of, among other things, inappropriately placing his hand on the upper thigh of a woman at her place of employment while she was working there.
The woman sought and was granted an interpersonal protective order – which Turcotte also unsuccessfully appealed – to keep him away from her, and she also filed a complaint with the department, as did two of her co-workers. He was placed on administrative leave with pay at first, while the matter was investigated internally and by the Kentucky State Police. Ultimately, a misdemeanor criminal charge was filed against him of harassment with physical contact but no injury. That case is still pending and may go to trial next month in Monroe County, where the special judge and special prosecutor on the case are based. Although no documentation has been submitted for the official court file in Barren County of an anticipated agreed order that would allow a change of venue for the trial or of an order setting the trial date, subpoenas have been served to at least two potential witnesses in the trial, instructing them to be present at 10 a.m. April 11 in Monroe District Court.
After the criminal charge was filed, Turcotte’s leave status was changed to unpaid.
Although Turcotte sought to delay a disciplinary hearing before Mayor Henry Royse regarding his employment status, noting that he still had the criminal trial pending and his testimony at the hearing could impact that case, when the mayor opted to move forward with the hearing anyway in July 2023, Turcotte did not attend.
On Aug. 10, the mayor issued his written findings and decision that terminated Turcotte’s employment.
In his March 14 order dismissing the civil lawsuit Turcotte filed in Barren Circuit Court to contest his firing, Alexander states that several witnesses testified at that private hearing, with each being subject to cross-examination by Turcotte’s attorney, who is Matt Baker, and Turcotte was given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense.
“Following the hearing, and after reviewing the testimony of the witnesses, the findings and [IPO] entered by the Family Court, and the arguments of counsel, Royce (sic) found substantial evidence that Turcotte had violated GPD Policy 1.1 ETHICS and Policy 12.1 CODE OF CONDUCT,” Alexander’s order states. “He concluded that Turcotte should be immediately terminated from his employment with the GPD. This administrative appeal followed.”
At the IPO hearing in Family Court, Turcotte did testify under oath as to his version of what occurred.
The judge, pointing out that the words “guilty” and “charge” in this context have different meanings than in a criminal case, noted that when an officer who is found guilty of a charge in a disciplinary proceeding appeals that action by bringing an action in circuit court, “the circuit court’s review is to be based solely upon the administrative record created before the hearing authority and any new evidence offered by the officer regarding alleged arbitrariness on the part of the hearing authority,” according to state law.
Based on case precedent, he writes that the standard that must be met “is the ‘clearly erroneous’ rule set out in Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.”
Alexander states, citing other case precedents, that in undertaking a disciplinary proceeding against a police officer, the function of the hearing authority – the mayor in this case – is to make two determinations. First, he had to determine whether the officer violated the rules and regulations of the department, and, if it is found that the officer did violate them, then the hearing authority “must exercise its discretion in imposing a penalty. The first is subject to judicial review; the second is not. In other words, the reviewing court may not interfere with the choice of available discipline; it is without authority to change the penalty imposed … in the absence of a finding that the threshold decision was arbitrary and capricious or was a clear abuse of discretion.”
The judge says that Turcotte’s primary challenge is based “not on an argument that the City has exceeded its statutory authority, or that there was insufficient evidence, but on Royce’s (sic) decision not to postpone the hearing in light of the parallel criminal prosecution against Turcotte …. This is essentially an argument that he was not afforded due process.”
The order from Alexander states that Turcotte’s position is that the disciplinary hearing should have been delayed until after the criminal case was resolved so he didn’t have to choose between testifying at the hearing and remaining silent, a wish that was understandable. But the judge also noted that the disciplinary action related to more than just the conduct alleged in the criminal complaint.
In looking at the privilege of avoiding self-incrimination, the order states that it has two types of protection in criminal proceedings: The defendant cannot be compelled to testify and the factfinder cannot draw inferences against the defendant based on a refusal to testify. The mayor did not attempt to force Turcotte to testify at the hearing and he specifically noted that he did not hold against Turcotte his invocation of the right to remain silent, according to the order, which continued that that boils the issue down to whether the mayor abused his discretion in proceeding with the hearing.
Under Kentucky law, there are seven factors that provide guidance when addressing the appropriateness of a request to pause administrative or other civil proceedings while a related criminal matter is pending, and Alexander lists those and says that Royse’s written findings demonstrate that he considered those factors and did not abuse his discretion in doing so.
While some of the information Royse considered overlapped with information that could be presented at the misdemeanor trial, not all of it did, Alexander notes.
“For example, Royse’s decision was based at least in part on factors other than the allegation of appropriate touching, including that Turcotte ‘flashed his gun and badge’ to gain access to areas not accessible to the public; that he stated, ‘It’s okay, I’m a cop,’ while on personal as opposed to official business, for the same reason; that he engaged in ‘highly inappropriate’ conduct, including making comments and surreptitiously taking photographs of a worker from behind while she was bending over, occurring in ‘a commercial business environment’ but which would not have been ‘remotely acceptable’ in any context, and that he had an IPO against him which contained restrictions which would interfere with his ability to act as a police officer,” the order states. “In other words, there was considerably more evidence involved in this proceeding that the proof which would be involved in the pending criminal prosecution for an offense that essentially amounts to touching another person inappropriately.”
The judge found that, at the time the delay of the hearing was sought, no definite time frame was available, but the law that dictates the procedures for disciplining an officer does have time constraints, to wanting to move forward rather than have a postponement of indefinite duration was “reasonable under the circumstances.”
Noting again that Turcotte had testified at the IPO hearing in Family Court, at the time of the hearing he had already made “voluntary and arguably incriminating statements” under oath concerning some of the allegations, the order states, before moving to the point that the mayor observed that he considered whatever ultimate outcome there may be on the misdemeanor case to have no bearing on his own decision. This was based in part in that different standards of proof are necessary for a disciplinary hearing than for a criminal case.
“[T]he Court has reviewed the record and finds that [Royse] did not exceed the statutory powers of a hearing authority either in conducting the hearing or in the discipline that was imposed, nor did the proceeding fail to comply with [state law regarding officer discipline],” the order states.
Although Turcotte was not arguing that Royse’s decision lacked sufficient factual support or that the factual findings did not bring his conduct within the policies cited, “Out of an abundance of caution, however, the Court has reviewed the record, including the [sealed] transcript of the hearing and the exhibits, to independently assess whether the findings had substantial support. The Court finds that the Written Findings and Decision of Appointing Authority had substantial evidentiary support and that [Royse’s] application of the policies in question was not erroneous or inappropriate.”
Further, Alexander found that the “decision to move forward with the hearing was not arbitrary and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.”
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